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Abstract 
Using quantitative and qualitative data, this paper contributes to debates on the uneven 
geographies of neoliberal animal disease regulation. Specifically, the paper analyses the 
impacts of neoliberal reforms to animal disease regulation in Great Britain. Focussing on the 
case of bovine tuberculosis (bTB), the paper analyses how changes to ‘relational distance’ in 
animal disease regulation have led to closer relationships between regulators (veterinarians) 
and regulatees (farmers) which in turn has led to a departure from standardised disease 
regulation to approaches that emphasise greater flexibility and judgement. The paper 
presents quantitative analysis of bTB testing data revealing the gradual erosion of 
government control of bTB regulation and significant variations in disease diagnosis between 
vets in the private and public sectors. Drawing on interviews with senior veterinarians in 
Government and veterinary organisations, the paper shows how these regulatory structures 
evolved and came to be accepted despite their limitations. The paper concludes by 
considering how relational distance contributes to an understanding of the nature of disease 
and its implications for the wider regulation of animal disease. 
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1  Introduction 
Neoliberal approaches to managing animal disease revolve around attempts to harmonise 
biosecurity practices across global space. In this deterritorialisation of agri-economic space, 
disease is standardised by disease management practices, risk assessments, and other 
metrological regimes that are designed and relied upon to patrol the boundaries of disease-
free countries and ensure continued free trade between them (Braun, 2007). In practice, 
however, the harmonisation of biosecurity practices is invariably uneven: national economic 
interests may deflect international economic concerns requiring biosecurity solutions to be 
reworked at local scales (Higgins and Dibden, 2011; Higgins et al., 2012; Mather and 
Marshall, 2011; Maye et al., 2012). Instead, biosecurity standards are given a local character 
as they emerge ‘out of complex articulations between actors in multiple locations’ (Higgins 
and Larner, 2010: 10) to make global rules workable across different agricultural spaces.  
This paper contributes to these understandings of the uneven geography of biosecurity 
regulations, practices and procedures. The paper draws on the concept of ‘relational 
distance’ (Black, 1976) to analyse the effects of changes to the governance and regulation 
of animal disease in Great Britain. Relational distance refers to the cultural and institutional 
proximity between regulators and regulatees. Reforms to Government regulation in Great 
Britain have seen attempts to lengthen this distance to ensure stricter and more objective 
approaches. Despite significant changes to the organisation of the governance of animal 
disease in Great Britain there have been few attempts to analyse their effects upon the way 
animal disease is regulated in practice, or their wider implications for the governance of 
animal disease (Enticott et al., 2011). 
The focus for the paper is on the reorganisation of the regulatory landscape for one animal 
disease – bovine tuberculosis (bTB) – and analyses how changes to this landscape have 
come about and contributed to tensions between different disease management and 
surveillance practices amongst private and public sector veterinarians. The paper begins by 
defining the concept of relational distance and describing how it is reflected in changing 
patterns of Government regulation. After outlining the background to bTB in Great Britain, 
the paper draws on qualitative and quantitative data to suggest that the relational distance of 
veterinary regulation affects practices of disease surveillance and the nature of disease 
itself. The paper shows how these practices have evolved from a mixture of necessity and 
the mutual interests of the Government and the veterinary profession. The paper argues that 
whilst this mixture contributes to different ways of understanding and diagnosing disease, it 
simultaneously holds it together, making changes to the system extremely difficult, leading to 
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an implicit accommodation of difference and an uneven geography of animal disease 
regulation. 
 
2  Regulation, Relational Distance and Neoliberalism 
A key focus of regulatory studies has been to determine what constitutes effective 
regulation: how is it possible for regulators to ensure regulatees comply with the law? Here, 
the first challenge is to determine what constitutes regulatory compliance: as regulatory 
studies point out, compliance does not simply mean obeying regulations. For Lipsky (1980), 
regulations and compliance are given meaning by the social context of regulators and those 
they are regulating. Thus, it is through exposure to and coping with varying contexts that 
regulators come to enact multiple versions of public policy on an on-going basis. What 
counts as compliance is therefore a matter of interpretation, whilst attempts to enforce 
compliance may take the form of various different strategies, some more legalistic or formal 
than others.  
Different strategies of regulation are witnessed across different areas of economic activity. In 
reviewing safety in coal mines, Braithwaite (1985) considers the differences between 
regulatory strategies of persuasion and punishment employed by mine inspectors. 
Persuasion may arise as a necessary strategy for inspectors living in the same small 
communities as those they regulate. In studies of environmental health regulation, Hutter 
(1988) distinguishes between ‘insistent’ (i.e. formal) and ‘negotiated’ (i.e. persuasive) 
strategies of regulation. Hutter shows that Environmental Health Officers in rural local 
authorities are more likely to adopt a negotiated approach due to the close relationships 
between business owners and local politicians. In studies of farm pollution, Lowe et al. 
(1997) show how pollution inspectors base their style of enforcement on their judgements of 
farmers’ social characteristics and an ability to do business with them. In short, these studies 
highlight how regulation and compliance is constituted in practice and is dependent upon 
social and environmental contexts. 
The effect of situational and contextual factors upon regulation practices is captured within 
Black’s (1976) extensive analysis of the laws of law. Black (p.3-4) argues that ‘law is a 
quantitative variable. It increases and decreases, and one setting has more than 
another!law varies in time and space’. These geographical variations in the quantity of law 
exist at a local scale between legal settings, and at regional and national scales. There are 
also different styles in applying law: one person is punished, another is given sympathy, 
whilst for others there are no consequences. For Black, all these variations in the style and 
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quantity of law are explained by the relationship between law and aspects of social life, 
specifically factors such as stratification, morphology, culture, organisation, and social 
control. Of specific relevance to regulation studies are the effects of morphology. Black 
(1976: p.37) refers to morphology as ‘the horizontal aspect of social life – the distribution of 
people in relation to one another, including their division of labour, networks of interaction, 
intimacy and integration’. Here, Black develops the concept of relational distance to explain 
variations in law. Relational distance describes the extent to which people (e.g. regulators 
and regulatees) participate in one another’s lives, i.e. their intimacy. Relational distance can 
be measured by identifying ‘the scope, frequency and length of interaction between people, 
the age of their relationship, and the nature and number of links between them in a social 
network’ (Black, 1976: p.41). The greater the relational distance – the further apart people 
are culturally, institutionally or physically – the more likely it is that regulators will adopt 
legalistic or enforcement-oriented approaches to regulation. The closer it is, the more likely it 
is for informal and negotiated strategies to be employed. In support, Black points to evidence 
that people with close relational distance (‘intimates’) are less likely to call the police about 
crimes committed against each other and when they do, the police are less likely to view 
their complaints as crimes or make an arrest (Black 1970, 1971). The relational distance 
between the law and citizens also predicts regulation: ‘the closer the relationship between an 
official and an offender, the less law!a policeman is more lenient toward someone close to 
him - a relative, friend, neighbour or fellow policeman’ (Black, 1976: p. 44; see also Hagan, 
1966). By contrast, relational distance widens ‘as people crowd together in time and space 
with practically everyone a stranger to everyone else’ (Black, 1976: p.45). As urbanisation 
increases, so too does the application of formal law.  
In environmental regulation, Braithwaite’s (1985) study of mining regulation highlights how 
relational distance influences the regulatory strategies available to inspectors. Persuasive 
strategies are common when mine inspectors can nurture rapport by visiting the same mine 
several times a year and can return to check that suggestions have been followed. Where 
there is a high turnover in inspectors and infrequent visits, a persuasive strategy is unlikely 
to command much respect from management. The influence of relational distance on 
regulatory strategies is not confined to coal mines: Grabosky and Braithwaite (1986) show 
how relational distance influences regulatory strategies in 96 business regulation agencies 
across Australia. Covering agencies responsible for regulating corporate affairs, 
environmental protection, food standards, medicine, occupational health and safety, 
transport safety, discrimination and fraud, they distinguish four ways in which relational 
distance affects regulatory practices. Firstly, regulatory agencies that only dealt with a small 
number of companies were less likely to resort to legal sanctions. None of the nine agencies 
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that regulated fewer than 50 different organisations sought legal sanctions, whilst the 50 
agencies that dealt with over 1000 different companies frequently resorted to a legal 
approach. Secondly, regulators that only dealt with companies drawn from a single industry 
were less likely to adopt a formal legal approach than those who dealt with many. For single 
industry regulators the median number of legal cases was 2.5 compared to 10.5 for diverse 
industry regulators. Thirdly, regulators who had frequent contact with the same firms were 
significantly less likely to use legal sanctions than those with no on-going relationship. 
Finally, where regulatory agencies had a large proportion of staff drawn from the industries 
they regulate, they tended to prosecute offences less frequently. In addition, Grabosky and 
Braithwaite (1986) show that the size of the company being regulated also had a significant 
impact on the type of regulatory strategy used. One interpretation is that larger organisations 
exert more power over regulators to prevent legal sanctions, thereby undermining the 
significance of relational distance. Whilst this remains a possibility, Grabosky and 
Braithwaite (1986) argue that it is difficult to disentangle these two explanations: lack of 
prosecutions, they argue, may be because regulators who regularly meet with organisations 
they are regulating are more able to persuade them to comply with rules. Similarly, Marsden 
et al (2000) show how organisational size leads to different regulatory strategies in the food 
sector. They argue that trading standards officers prosecute large national companies 
because, compared to small businesses, they are expected to know the rules and have 
effective self-regulation strategies in place. Thus, regulators often adopt persuasive 
strategies with small companies, but when large national companies make small errors, legal 
sanctions are more likely to follow. 
One limitation of Grabosky and Braithwaite’s (1986) research is that conviction rates rather 
than all prosecutions are used assess relational distance. Moreover, as Hood et al (1999) 
point out, resorting to prosecution is not always open to some regulators, particularly those 
operating within Government. Instead, in examining the regulatory behaviour of Government 
regulators (such as auditors, fire, police and education inspectorates) Hood et al. (1999: 61) 
develop an ‘index of formality’ which takes into account regulators’ attitudes towards 
regulatees as well as the degree of formalised rule-bound regulation. Their analysis provides 
further support for the role of relational distance. The degree of formal regulation was 
explained well by shared experiences (such as previously working in the regulated 
organisation) and familiarity (in terms of the frequency of contact between regulators and 
regulatees). However, there was no relationship between formal regulation and the number 
of regulatees, whilst there was only a moderate relationship between the diversity of 
regulated organisations and formal regulation. Nevertheless, Hood et al (1999, p.65) 
conclude that ‘relational distance often seems important in shaping the way regulation in 
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Government works’, meaning that the regulator-regulatee relationship should be a key factor 
in the institutional design of Government regulation. 
In fact, since the late 1980s, reconfiguring relational distance has been a key element of 
neoliberal reforms to Government regulation. The concept and tools of neoliberalism are 
frequently hard to define, being far from monolithic or a uniform set of practices (Hodge and 
Adams, 2012; Maye et al., 2012). Instead they are better characterised as a vast number of 
“local trajectories, contingent forms and hybrid assemblages” of capitalist logic (Peck et al., 
2010: p.96). However, three strategies of neoliberal rule that have redrawn the relational 
distance of Government regulation can be discerned. Firstly, in attempting to transform the 
efficiency of public services, there has seen an ever greater reliance on a range of 
performance management, indicators and targets (Henkel, 1991). These techniques of audit 
have the capacity to ‘govern from a distance’ (Barry, 2001) and claim objectivity and 
neutrality (Humphrey, 2001, 2002) by distancing regulators from regulatees. For services like 
education and social services, it is argued that these changes to relational distance have 
seen an epistemological shift in the nature of regulation. Where regulators were reliant on 
professional expertise and judgement, new adversarial forms of regulation and 
managerialism have taken their place with the aim of identifying default (Day and Klein, 
1990; Kogan and Maden, 1999). 
Secondly, the creation of new regulatory agencies has facilitated a redrawing of relational 
distance. The process of ‘agencification’ removed civil servants from Government and 
placed them in new delivery agencies where they could deliver policy free from bureaucratic 
hurdles and adopt business management techniques usually found in the private sector 
(Efficiency Unit, 1988; Self, 1993). In doing so, the relational distance between regulators 
and the regulated was lengthened in an effort to ensure a less variable approach to 
regulation. For example, the establishment of the Meat Hygiene Service (MHS) in 1995 
centralised arrangements for inspecting fresh meat plants to protect against the risks of 
animal disease (principally Bovine Spongiform Encephalopoly [BSE]). The creation of the 
MHS addressed concerns that local authorities were not enforcing BSE regulations because 
of close relational distance between local politicians and local businesses (Eves, 2006).  
Thirdly, whilst neoliberal regimes have sought to deregulate (so called ‘roll-back’ 
neoliberalism), ‘roll-out’ neoliberalism suggests that industry becomes the architect of new 
strategies of regulation (Peck and Tickell, 2002). In the governance of animal disease, this 
has meant that industry translates consumer desires into ‘checklists of acceptable farming 
practices’ that can be audited by regulators (Haggerty et al., 2009: p.768). On the one hand, 
roll-out neoliberalism can lead to close relational distance as industry come to determine 
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regulatory standards. On the other, exposing regulation to market forces can also lead to an 
increase in relational distance. For example, in Great Britain, slaughterhouse inspection is 
contracted-out to a small number of private companies who procure vets to conduct the work 
from specialist recruitment agencies. This work has become particularly popular amongst 
foreign trained vets (Lowe, 2009). Thanks to the use of short-term contracts, the 
employment of overseas veterinarians and the comparative social isolation of these vets 
from the rest of the veterinary profession and local businesses, relational distance for this 
system of regulation can be high. 
However, the impact of these strategies upon the regulatory practices of animal disease as a 
result of changes to relational distance has not been fully researched. There is limited 
evidence to suggest that neoliberal regulatory structures have contributed to the redefinition 
of what constitutes veterinary regulation, how it is done and who should do it (Enticott et al., 
2011). In other policy areas, research has suggested that despite the apparent scientific and 
objective nature of new regulatory practices, inspectors are forced to adopt negotiating 
positions, rely on intuition and judgement, and make trade-offs in order for their judgements 
to be accepted (Downe and Martin, 2007). In other words, the consequence of re-organising 
the relational distance between regulator and regulatee by no means leads to a 
straightforward switch from informal and negotiated regulation to that which is formalised 
and standardised. Rather, these organisational shifts may lead to a subtle accommodation of 
different styles of regulation, shaped by the day-to-day demands of completing regulatory 
work, and in doing so raise questions over the nature of the object of regulation and the 
expertise required to identify it. The remainder of this paper explores the extent to which 
changes to the relational distance of animal disease regulation have impacted upon the very 
diagnosis of animal disease.  
 
3  The Regulation of Animal Health: A case study of bovine tuberculosis 
Animal diseases over which the British Government exercise regulatory responsibility are 
defined by the World Organisation for Animal Health and incorporated within European 
Union (EU) directives on international trade. Known as statutory notifiable diseases, 
outbreaks of these diseases must be brought under control or have on-going eradication 
plans if exports of animals or animal products are to continue. An example of an endemic 
notifiable disease that has been subject to on-going Government-led eradication efforts is 
bovine Tuberculosis (bTB), a zoonotic bacterial infection that can be passed between 
animals and humans. The disease is commonly found in cattle and wildlife, specifically 
badgers, and was first recognised as an animal and public health problem at the end of the 
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Nineteenth Century. Although public health concerns are now minimal (Health Protection 
Agency., 2006), bTB is frequently described as the most challenging and complicated animal 
disease in Great Britain (Defra, 2013). Whilst eradication of the disease in cattle was virtually 
achieved in the 1960s (MAFF, 1965), from the 1970s, cases began to rise steadily (Krebs et 
al., 1997). In 2012, over 37000 cattle were slaughtered due to bTB infection (Defra, 2013). 
The disease is concentrated in the west and south-west of England and west Wales. 
Managing the disease is made complicated by the involvement of badgers as a disease 
vector. As an iconic and culturally significant animal in Great Britain, badgers are protected 
by law and Government-led badger culling strategies have been disrupted by public protest 
(Enticott, 2001). Scientific studies have found only limited support for the effectiveness of 
badger culling (Independent Scientific Group (ISG). 2007).  
In this complicated policy environment, and without a useable cattle vaccine, the Department 
for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) has relied upon routine cattle surveillance 
conducted by vets to identify and manage the disease. Cattle in areas with high disease 
prevalence are tested on an annual basis using the Single Intradermal Cervical Comparative 
Test, or ‘skin test’ for short (de la Rua-Domenech et al., 2006). Diagnosis of at least one 
animal with bTB (known as a reactor) leads to those cattle being slaughtered and the whole 
herd being placed under movement restrictions, meaning the farmer cannot move cattle on 
or off the farm for any purpose (such as trade). Positive herds are retested every two months 
until the whole herd has passed two consecutive tests when trading regulations are lifted.  
The scale of the problem means that bTB is the most pressing animal disease problem for 
Defra, costing the taxpayer £100m a year and has resulted in a vast regulatory landscape 
involving agencies and actors from both public and private sectors (Defra, 2013). When it 
comes to bTB testing, tests may be conducted by vets working for the Animal Health and 
Veterinary Laboratories Agency (AHVLA1). The growth of the disease in recent years has 
meant that vets in private practices have also been asked to conduct disease surveillance, 
usually of their own clients’ herds.  This mix of public and private regulation provides an ideal 
opportunity to examine the effect of relational distance on the regulation of animal disease. 
Data were collected as part of a mixed-methods project investigating veterinarians’ 
approaches to bTB testing. The project involved ethnographic participant observation of vets 
in two private practices and a regional office of the AHVLA over 5 months focussing on the 
day to day practice of veterinary regulation and the relationship between organisational 
culture and bTB testing practices. Fieldwork took place in 2008-9. Following its completion, 
interviews with 19 Government veterinarians (in AHVLA and Defra), representatives of 
veterinary organisations (the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons and British Veterinary 
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Association) and academic vets were conducted on the subject of veterinary regulation. 
These data were triangulated with findings from the ethnographic fieldwork.  Data from bTB 
tests were also analysed to look for differences in the diagnosis of bTB between private and 
Government vets. These data were extracted from the AHVLA’s Vetnet database for three 
counties in England and Wales. The counties (Devon, Gloucestershire and Dyfed) were 
chosen because they have high levels of bTB incidence. The dataset contains details of the 
type of bTB test, the number of cattle tested, the number of reactors and who completed the 
test. In total, data were provided for 89567 bTB tests conducted between 2004-9. Most tests 
were routine surveillance tests (61025) with the remainder on herds already with bTB 
(known as short interval tests). The vast majority of tests were performed by private vets 
(83899). 
 
4  The effect of changing regulatory regimes on animal health 
This section explores changes to the regulation of bTB. It begins by considering the extent to 
which private sector vets have become involved in animal disease regulation and their 
impact upon disease diagnosis. Secondly, the section examines the reasons why private 
vets have become a cornerstone of bTB regulation despite concerns about their suitability to 
act as impartial regulators. 
 
4.1 Changing patterns of veterinary regulation 
The veterinary profession has long referred to its public good function in regulating animal 
disease to justify why private vets should receive Government funding (Anon., 1966; Woods, 
2007). Testing for bTB represents a key part of its public good commitment but in reality data 
suggest that this contribution has only come relatively recently. Figures 1 and 2 show this 
quite clearly. Both figures reveal the changing distribution of veterinary regulation over ten 
years in England between the private and public sectors. The sudden drop in 2001 was a 
result of the suspension of bTB testing during the outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease in 
2001. Overall however, the pattern is one of increasing testing by the private sector, 
particularly from 2002 onwards. In fact, the actual number of bTB tests conducted by 
Government vets is unchanged from 2006 when compared to 1996 despite a worsening of 
the overall levels of disease.  
[insert figures 1 and 2 here] 
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These changes are even more remarkable at a local level. Figure 2 shows the distribution of 
short interval tests in the county of Devon, a county with long standing higher than average 
levels of bTB. Short interval tests occur every 60 days on a herd that has been diagnosed 
with bTB. It is important that these are conducted to high standards to ensure that the herd is 
cleared of infection: as a former Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) said in an interview: “the 
short interval tests have got to be done absolutely following the protocols”. In 1996 it was 
extremely rare for any short interval tests to be handed over to vets in private practice. 
Despite a worsening disease picture, this remained the case until 2000 when only a small 
proportion of short interval tests were completed by the private sector. However, three years 
later, private vets were completing more short interval tests than Government vets. 
Moreover, from 2003 the number of short interval tests completed by Government vets went 
into decline despite rapidly rising levels of disease. In fact, by 2006 the numbers of tests 
conducted by Government vets was lower than it was in 2002 by which time levels of 
disease had risen considerably.  
During this time, the training requirements for bTB testing also changed. To qualify for bTB 
testing, vets traditionally attended a two day training course organised by the State 
Veterinary Service (SVS) dealing with the theoretical and practical aspects of training. 
However, as demand for testing increased, so did the need to train more vets so that they 
could complete the test, and just as the ability of the SVS to complete tests was limited, so 
was its time to train vets. The arrangements therefore changed according to regional 
demands. In those areas with high levels of bTB, the theoretical part of the training remained 
with the SVS, whilst the practical element was handed over to the private sector. In effect, 
veterinary practices became responsible for training their own staff in how to complete a bTB 
test. The rationale for this shift was described by one Divisional Veterinary Manager (DVM) 
in the following way:  
“And of course we’re screaming at people to get tests done we can’t be a barrier to 
appointment. Putting off perfectly good people. So you know, that’s the way we ran 
it”. 
Why did this shift occur? Shifts to neoliberal styles of regulation are often marked by the 
establishment of new organisations. The story is more complicated in the governance animal 
disease. One of the results of the 2001 Foot and Mouth Disease outbreak in Great Britain 
was to expose the SVS as ill-prepared to respond to a national disaster (see Wilkinson et al., 
2010). In the aftermath, the SVS was stripped from Defra and created as an agency in 2005 
with the responsibility of managing animal disease. Whilst this type of agencification is often 
associated with the introduction of new managerial processes – such as contracting-out 
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services through competitive tendering to enhance efficiency – it seems these changes to 
the organisation of bTB testing were already occurring. Interviews with senior vets suggest 
that the process was gradual and borne out of necessity. Government vets suggested that 
there was never a moment when a decision was made to switch to the private sector. 
Rather, as one former DVM stated, “we started to push all the testing out because that was 
the easier way of doing the work”. Similarly, a former CVO responded when shown figure 2:  
“it’s a question of resource!it comes back to the fact that it’s a question of who’s 
available to do these tests!if it’s just a straight huge increase in [the] number of 
outbreaks, you’ve got to use whatever resource you’ve got”. 
These changes in veterinary regulation are hard to make sense of when compared to the 
same senior vets’ concerns about the role of private vets. In interviews, senior Government 
vets believed that the quality of bTB testing by private vets was of poor quality, that their 
failure to follow the testing procedures was compromising disease management and that the 
increasing role of private veterinarians was not having a positive effect on the management 
of the disease. Reactions to figure 2 from senior vets in Defra and AHVLA captured these 
concerns: 
“for 10 years [we have] been saying we are unhappy with this. We’ve been making 
clear that we see it as a real risk to see more and more priority tests passing out to 
the private practice”  
“the reason why this is worrying is because I don’t believe that these people reliably 
test each individual animal to the same standard as [Government vets] and this is an 
individual animal test this isn’t a herd test”2 
Others commented that the mind-set and expertise of private vets was completely different 
to that of vets working directly for Government which affected their interpretation of test 
results, particularly in marginal cases: 
“[Private vets’] philosophy is ‘my job is to look after my client, minimise the impact on 
my client. Make sure he gets the best deal, and all the rest of it’. Whereas the 
Government vet, because we have Duty Vets, they can go out and do that case, they 
can take out the technicians to support them...they’ve got the training to do 
epidemiology and we’re beginning to train more and more of them in epidemiology. 
They’ve got the time to do it...Where I think private vets have an important role is in 
prevention. So once you’ve got the outbreak confirmed I don’t, I wouldn’t want private 
vets having a lot of involvement” [former CVO] 
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These comments do not simply reflect concerns over private vets’ expertise, but an 
increasing divide in the nature of veterinary expertise between the public and private sectors. 
Just as Government vets were concerned about the skills and knowledge of private vets, so 
too did private vets voice their criticisms of the expertise of Government vets. In interviews 
with private vets, Government vets were criticised for being too distant from the problem; for 
not being able to appreciate the realities of ‘real’ veterinary or farm work; imposing rules for 
their own sake rather than for good veterinary reasons; and accused of crossing T’s ad 
dotting I’s for their own sake. Certainly, their image of what counted as a competent vet was 
not consistent with the type of desk-bound work that private vets assumed Government vets 
to be mainly involved with. Thus, as more and more tests were handed over to private vets, 
so the boundary of bTB expertise shifted towards them, allowing them to question the 
competency of Government vets and their policies.  
Government vets’ concerns about private vets’ bTB testing practices also reflect this 
deepening divide in types of veterinary expertise and their respective knowledge bases, and 
were confirmed during the ethnographic phase of the research. The ethnographic analysis 
associated with the project showed that vets in private practice developed their own 
regulatory practices to cope with the demands of the volume and difficulties of bTB testing. 
This usually involved bending or ignoring elements of the testing protocol to suit different 
farm conditions and disease situations. Whilst the knowledge of which corners to cut was a 
product of shared practice cultures, it was also developed through their close contact with 
farmers. As vets already knew many of the farmers they tested as clients, this close 
relational distance allowed a negotiation over the result of tests; the application of veterinary 
judgement to interpret positive tests; and farmers requesting that only the vets they ‘could do 
business with’ test their herd. Private vets were particularly confused about who was 
responsible for the safety of a test and unless a farm was obviously dangerous stated that 
they were unlikely to tell the farmer how they should be handling their animals for the 
purposes of the test (for more details see: Enticott, 2012). The close relational distance 
between private vets and farmers ensured that the practice and expertise required of bTB 
testing was co-produced and locally variable. Such variations of the testing protocol were not 
found amongst Government vets working for AHVLA. Instead, their whole organisational 
environment was framed by procedures, regulations and conforming to rules. These vets 
routinely spoke of the need to follow procedures in order to manage the disease properly. It 
was rare for them to visit the same farm twice or have had previous contact with the farmer. 
Many of these vets were young, working on short term contracts, from abroad and did not 
know any of the farmers they were regulating. In these circumstances, relational distance 
was high and conformity to the bTB testing protocol unsurprising.   
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In fact analysis of bTB testing data provides confirmation that close relational distance 
impacts upon the diagnosis of bTB. One way of comparing the relative performance of 
Government and private vets is by comparing the number of diseased animals they find with 
the number of animals tested. The figure of reactors per 1000 (RpT) cattle tested is often 
calculated to express disease incidence, but can also be used to measure detection rates by 
vets. Table 1 shows significant differences exist between vets working for the private sector 
and those working directly for the Government. For the three high bTB incidence counties 
analysed (Dyfed, Devon and Gloucestershire), Government vets found on average 14 more 
reactors per 1000 animals tested, and 19 more during short interval tests. This pattern is 
repeated across five years of bTB testing and was most pronounced during short interval 
tests. Calculation of odds ratios provide further confirmation of the differences between 
private and Government vets. For all types of bTB test, Government vets were more than 
twice as likely to diagnose bTB infected herds (Odds Ratio: 2.388 Confidence Interval: 2.251 
– 2.532). Odds ratios were lower, but still statistically significantly when short interval and 
routine tests were examined separately. Regression analysis indicated that RpT was not 
influenced by herd size. It is possible that other factors may explain these variations. For 
example, Government vets may be more likely to test problem herds (for example, herd 
owners that refuse to test) that are likely to harbour reactors. Overall, however, the results 
indicate that Government vets find more reactors because they apply a stricter interpretation 
of the testing procedure. Where test results are marginal, Government vets appear more 
likely to condemn them, whilst private vets are more likely to give cattle a chance or take into 
account contextual factors in their diagnosis (see Enticott, 2012). 
[Table 1]  
Whilst these results indicate that relational distance does make a difference to the outcome 
of a bTB test, they might also indicate something more fundamental about the nature of 
disease itself. Recent biosecurity studies have argued that the fixed and standardised 
procedures to international biosecurity regulations may be less effective than looser forms of 
expertise which can accommodate difference (Hinchliffe, 2007). Mather and Marshall (2011), 
for example, show how uneven regulatory approaches facilitated the management of avian 
influenza in South Africa. Accepting an accommodation of difference – which in this case 
might refer to the different interpretations of bTB test results by private and Government vets 
– suggests too that there are multiple versions of disease, each enacted through different 
practices. As Law and Mol (2011) describe, ways of diagnosing disease enact specific 
disease ontologies: a version of disease that performs and is performed by a specific set of 
practices, materials, and expertise. Whilst Law and Mol describe how clinical, laboratory and 
epidemiological practices produce different versions of disease, the differences between 
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public and private veterinarians suggest that different versions of disease are enacted within 
the same practices. As Enticott (2012, p.85) argues: “multiple versions of disease do not 
depend on wildly different diagnostic techniques but on subtle variations in technique 
developed in relation to cows, vets, farmers and other actors!the balance between them is 
constantly shifting at different farms and for different animals”. By comparing public and 
private vets, these findings also show that the balancing out of different factors occurs in the 
context of the relational distance in which veterinary regulation is situated. Thus, versions of 
bTB are not just produced by different diagnostic methods, but by the relational distance 
inherent within the organisation of bTB testing. 
 
4.2 Regulating or living with disease? 
In the neoliberal governance of animal health, the acceptance of these kinds of difference is 
rarely an explicitly acceptable strategy. Nevertheless, the regulation of bTB suggests that 
they can at least be implicitly accepted in ways of managing disease. Why otherwise would 
the Government have continued to allow the increased use of private vets for bTB testing 
despite their concerns? One answer to this question is that a regulatory structure gradually 
emerged in which deviation from standardised procedures by private vets was inevitable 
because the approach to regulating disease allowed both Government and private vets to 
accrue wider benefits. In addition, the absence of external coercive pressures allowed the 
Government to implicitly accept these variations in practice, choosing instead to live with 
different versions of disease.  
The regulatory structures that led to the variations between private and Government vets 
were largely supported by an absence of external coercive pressures. Firstly, despite an EU 
directive setting the standards for the bTB test and disease eradication across all member 
states, there was little pressure from the EU. Whilst the EU’s Food and Veterinary Office 
(FVO) had previously expressed concerns about the quality of bTB testing during an 
inspection in 2004 (DG SANCO., 2004), the fact that Defra received no EU financial 
assistance to help with their management of bTB meant, in the words of one vet within 
Defra, that they could effectively ignore them despite effectively legitimising an infraction of 
an EU directive: 
“we’re actually breaking the law! I notice the EU are now contributing to the TB 
programme. The reason we didn’t ask them to up until recently was so we didn’t have 
them hassling us. So we got no EU funding. We could deal with TB control as 
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required, but we didn’t have visits and aggravation [from the EU]! we weren’t taking 
money off them then so we tell them to get stuffed”. 
Secondly, control over the regulatory policy vacillated between Defra and the various 
government agencies responsible for bTB. Whilst field staff in AHVLA complained about 
private vets making their job more difficult, interviews with Government vets suggested that 
ownership of the policy was confused with neither AHVLA nor Defra taking a lead. 
Discussions over reforms had stagnated, whilst staff resources and turnover in AHVLA 
meant that there few people with a clear understanding of the issues. Policy issues were 
therefore never satisfactorily dealt with: 
“[policy is] almost like rugby balls that people don’t want to hold and they give a 
hospital pass out to someone on the wing and just say ‘well do what you can with it’” 
[Defra vet] 
Thirdly, there was little coercive pressure from the agricultural industry. Many farmers were 
already distrustful of the Government in relation to bTB (Enticott, 2008) and considered a 
good bTB test to be one that was completed as quickly as possible. Fourthly, there were no 
significant pressures from the veterinary profession itself. Until 2009, the Royal College of 
Veterinary Surgeons had not disciplined any vets for poor bTB testing, largely because no 
cases had been referred to their disciplinary committee. Moreover, in interviews veterinary 
organisations disagreed with Government vets over what constituted a poor quality test: 
whilst some of vets’ transgressions of the bTB protocol were agreed to be of poor quality, 
other transgressions were seen as marginal and simply part of a veterinarians’ expertise. 
Indeed, the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons suggested that if testing guidelines were 
overly prescriptive and left no room for professional judgement then many vets could 
withdraw from bTB testing altogether (Defra, 2007).  
In the absence of coercive pressures, a self-reinforcing system of regulation became 
embedded in which Government and private vets became mutually dependent upon each 
other. Reforming or challenging the system was therefore extremely difficult as benefits 
accrued to each party and different interests reinforced the importance of maintaining the 
system. Passing more bTB tests to private practices has provided a valuable source of 
income stream to many veterinary practices. For those in areas of high bTB incidence, 
income from bTB testing can often account for over 25% of practice income, and in some 
cases much higher. Income from testing has allowed some practices to rapidly expand: 
testing income is used to subsidise wages for additional veterinary staff. For example, in 
interviews practice partners suggested that in a practice of ten vets, the loss of bTB testing 
income could result in the loss of two vets who would be able to bring in extra income from 
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conducting other veterinary tasks paid for by farmers and small animal clients. More 
importantly, the additional vets would also contribute to the out of hours rota, allowing a 
reduction in time spent on call or working at weekends. Income from bTB testing therefore 
helps to improve vets’ quality of life, whilst simultaneously contributing to the provision of 
veterinary services in rural areas. Without income from bTB testing, practice partners that 
were interviewed suggested that running the practice would be much harder and for some, it 
would be the cause of retirements and a further decline in the provision of farm animal 
veterinary services.  
Similarly, amongst Government vets there was recognition of the wider negative 
consequences of attempting to change the regulatory system. Whilst one Government vet 
described the situation as being ‘over a barrel’, the lack of alternative capacity meant that 
they were unable to threaten the vets in private practices that they were going to withdraw 
their right to conduct bTB tests in order to improve testing quality. Despite the belief that 
abuses were widespread, suspensions were therefore rarely considered, and punishments 
limited to a ‘professional chat’ (Defra vet interview). The entrenchment of bTB testing within 
private veterinary practice meant that Government faced a dilemma: withdrawing bTB testing 
from private practices would not only compromise their ability to maintain animal disease 
surveillance for bTB, but also the wider provision of farm animal veterinary services. Senior 
vets in Defra therefore recognised their dilemma in the following way: 
“you can’t suddenly cause an almighty rift by taking TB testing away from [private 
vets] because these practices of 10 or a dozen people will reduce the staff by 50% 
[so unless] you were prepared to see large animal veterinary work just go to the wall 
and all you’re interested in as a government or a society is to do cheap accurate TB 
testing, you would use cheap European vets...So, I don’t think you can solve the 
quality of TB testing argument without looking at these much wider things!and what 
role government has in creating the environment that will allow large animal practice 
to thrive” 
This dilemma therefore helps to account for the lack of change to the regulatory system. The 
benefits to each party had become such that the radical changes required to increase 
relational distance sat uneasily with the Government and the vets. In effect, by decreasing 
the relational distance between regulator and regulatee, the Government had not only 
encouraged the use of negotiated regulation based on veterinary judgement and deviation 
from the testing protocol, but they had also come to tacitly accept it. The Government’s 
ability to conduct veterinary regulation depended on living with these uncertainties rather 
than accepting that regulation must proceed in a scientific rational fashion, just as much as 
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the vets had when it came to testing in practice. Thus, in the same way that roll-back 
neoliberalism has handed regulatory control to agricultural elites in other areas of policy 
(Haggerty et al., 2009), so the power to decide how bTB tests should be completed, and how 
the disease should be defined and enacted, was effectively passed from Government to 
private vets. In coming to rely on the private sector to deliver bTB testing, variations in 
procedure were inevitable, but importantly the system allowed the volume of testing required 
to be completed.  
As indicated above, these kinds of accommodations and living with difference are what allow 
rules, regulations and classifications to hold firm. Timmermans and Berg (1997) for instance 
show that it is only by bending medical standards, that it is possible to ensure they work in all 
locations. Waterton (2002; 2003) takes a similar view in describing the problems of 
measuring biodiversity faced by biologists in the field, but also suggests that the flexible 
nature of standards and classifications is legitimised by Government actors at national and 
intra-national scales who are indifferent to the precision of classifications and protocols. 
Dibden et al’s (2011) analysis of biosecurity practices paint a similar picture: that global 
biosecurity regulations and standards are made to work thanks to local actors working to fit 
global rules to local contexts. For the regulation of bTB, something similar is afoot. Concerns 
over the quality of bTB testing reflect the ways in which practicing vets routinely bend the 
protocol in order for it to work in different contexts. Yet, these adaptations to the protocol are 
legitimised by the ways in which Government and the veterinary profession have organised 
the regulation of bTB. Ironically, the regulatory system for bTB has similarities to calls for 
these flexible systems to regulate and manage outbreaks of animal disease (Hinchliffe, 
2007; Law, 2006), but not through deliberate choice. Rather, Government vets have 
criticised practicing vets, and more recently begun to issue guidance and instructions to vets 
to encourage them to test according to the regulations. However, the insistence that vets 
follow the protocol and failure to re-organise the regulatory system means that the testing 
regulations may be instead seen as a symbolic order in which the importance of instructions, 
rules and protocols reflect a desire to appear rational. As Clarke (1999) suggests, albeit in a 
different context, the plans, protocols and training advice associated with veterinary 
regulation can be interpreted as ‘fantasy documents’ produced by organisations to give an 
impression of control, when it is clear that control of the system in its current format is an 
illusory goal. This rhetoric allows individual vets to be blamed for failures whilst the systemic 
problems associated with the relational distance of animal health regulation can be hidden 
away. That any punishments are for individual vets rather than veterinary practices reveal a 
reluctance to engage with the different forms of bTB enacted through variable testing 
practices. Thus, the emphasis on plans and standards in animal disease regulation can 
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instead be seen as rhetorical devices directed at external audiences to reassure them of the 
efficiency of animal disease regulation.  
 
5  Conclusion 
This paper has examined the effects of changes to the governance of animal health and 
their impacts upon the regulation of bovine Tuberculosis. In particular, the paper has been 
concerned with analysing how changes to the relational distance of veterinary regulation 
have impacted upon the practice of veterinary regulation. Neoliberal biosecurity governance 
demands that diseases are standardised through standard operating procedures and 
metrological regimes. However, the changing governance of bTB challenges these 
understandings of disease and biosecurity. Rather, reforms to the way disease is regulated 
has led to changes in the relational distance between regulators and regulatees. Whilst other 
public policy reforms have sought to increase relational distance, the reverse has been true 
for bTB regulation where increasing numbers of private veterinarians have been involved in 
bTB testing.  
The reduction of relational distance between regulators (vets) and regulatees (farmers) has 
had a number of effects. Firstly, it has led to a shifting balance in veterinary expertise in 
relation to bovine Tuberculosis. As Government vets have come to test proportionally fewer 
cattle – particularly cattle herds that are suffering from bTB – so vets in the private sector 
have gained greater competence and knowledge in bTB testing leading to divisions in what 
constitutes veterinary expertise between private and Government vets. Thus, as the volume 
of bTB testing has outstripped their colleagues in Government, so have private vets 
challenged the legitimacy and status of Government vets. Similarly, the increase in testing 
has allowed private vets to develop a field-level experiential knowledge-base to question and 
bend the testing protocol to fit local circumstances. Secondly, analysis of bTB testing data 
reveals that Government and private vets’ disease detection rates are different. These 
differences are likely to be related to their different approaches to bTB testing.  Thus, the 
changing distribution of veterinary regulation does not have neutral effect on the surveillance 
of animal disease. Thirdly, the paper shows that the organisation of bTB testing allows 
different versions of disease to be constructed which are tolerated by the mutual interests of 
Government, the veterinary profession and farmers which help secure a broader goal of 
animal disease surveillance and the provision of farm veterinary services. By providing 
benefits for all parties and with little external coercive pressures, this structure of veterinary 
regulation has become firmly embedded. Its organisation has therefore helped to create and 
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sustain cultures and boundaries of veterinary expertise in which the different organisations 
associated with the regulation of bTB are located.  
These findings also have wider significance for the governance and regulation of animal 
health. Studies of the implementation of international biosecurity regulations have shown 
that variations are common as local actors seek local solutions for international problems 
(Dibden et al., 2011). Results in this paper show a similar trend but, for some, they might 
also be interpreted as questioning moves to open up biosecurity regulations to more flexible 
decision-making. If by encouraging the greater use of approaches to animal disease 
regulation that suppress disease incidence, then such an approach may be less than 
desirable. However, it is also possible to interpret these results as a way of opening up a 
broader debate and scrutiny over the nature of biosecurity practices, regulations and disease 
itself. What this paper has shown is that organising the regulation of animal health is no 
simple matter. The organisation of regulations has social and biological consequences: it is 
only by considering what these might be and their origins does it become possible to ask 
questions about what is, might be and might not be desirable in veterinary regulation. 
Relational distance therefore provides a mechanism by which to consider these effects: it 
allows researchers to highlight the issues and compromises that may need to be taken into 
account when regulating animal disease. Considering relational distance highlights that the 
nature of animal disease is not straightforward, but emerges through complex sets of 
relationships, in which accommodations of difference may be inevitable – whether they are 
intended or not. It may be that effective veterinary regulation requires more than specifying 
scientific standards and protocols, and instead requires an examination of the social effects 
of the structure of veterinary regulation, and agreement on what is and isn’t acceptable, what 
can and cannot be accommodated (Hinchliffe, 2007; Law and Mol, 2011). Exploring 
relational distances therefore does more than describe a set of regulatory relationships: it 
opens up important questions about the nature of disease and the regulation of animal 
health that require public debate rather than closing down through narrow legalistic scientific 
definitions of animal disease. Asking questions, determining limits and assessing the social 
consequences of the regulation of animal disease is vital for the future of animal health.  
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